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We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper’s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.
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As a direct result of European Union (EU) laws on procurement, Britain was compelled to award a contract for train carriages to Siemens, rather than its preferred bidder Bombardier, at a cost of 1400 local jobs. Farmers, especially in Denmark and Germany, face losses because they can no longer market their cheese as ‘feta’ since under EU free movement of goods law it is a protected name reserved for Greek products. EU law also prohibits France from banning food that might contain genetically modified organisms, despite intense pressure to do so from its consumers and farmers. These are just a few examples of the fact that EU laws affect just about everything within the Member States. A political economy perspective provides compelling reasons to believe that when hammering out the details of these laws, each Member State bargains to defend their domestic interests (Moravcsik 2003:13-14, Thomson 2011). What national bargaining success involves, is a government consistently achieving what its citizens and key domestic groups want, as opposed to those of other states. Member States don’t offer policy concessions lightly precisely because having to implement rules that don’t “fit” with their existing domestic practices can prove enormously costly and politically unpopular (Knill 1998, Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2000, Borzel 2002, Thomson 2011:ch6). 
Given what is at stake, it is hardly surprising that the adoption of individual pieces of EU law often involves tortuous negotiations lasting many years, as Member States closely weigh the benefits they and their domestic constituents will receive and the costs they will incur. What is surprising, however, is that we know so little about a question that would seem to go to the very heart of how the EU works: whether the content of EU legislation tends to reflect the preferences of some states more than others. Much has been written over the years about whether EU legislation reflects the preferences of the European Parliament and Commission rather than the Council, but only a few studies have recognised the importance of systematically comparing national bargaining success rates for EU legislation within the Council (Bailer 2004, Selck and Kaeding 2004, Selck and Kuipers 2005, Arregui and Thomson 2009, Aksoy 2010, Thomson 2011).
This paper contributes to and extends this line of pioneering scholarship. It challenges some of the conceptual and methodological choices made in the existing work on national bargaining success and takes a fresh look at which states are relative winners and losers.1 I organise the analysis as follows. In the first section I construct two competing hypotheses about how the EU works. The first, and certainly the most widespread in EU scholarship, predicts that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, whereas the second predicts that the large Member States consistently achieve much more of what they really want than the small. After a brief overview of the best available dataset, from the well-known EU Decides project, section two addresses conceptual and methodological issues associated with determining comparative national bargaining success on EU legislation and highlights the advantages of my approach over that of previous studies. I present a straightforward, salience-weighted function to gauge the level of success for each Member State, then discuss the appropriate statistical techniques.
Section three tests the hypotheses. Neither performs well. Contrary to the dominant “all states win equally” view, the results suggest that some states achieve significantly more of what they really want than others. Moreover, there is absolutely no indication that large states beat small ones. If anything, France, Germany and Italy do particularly badly, whereas Luxembourg, Ireland, Austria and the Nordic states do especially well.
Demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think is the paper’s main contribution, and this important negative result serves the valuable function of setting the stage for further enquiry along two lines. Firstly, what is the theoretical explanation for the surprising empirical results? Secondly, from a normative perspective, does it really matter?  To develop conclusive answers to either question far exceeds the scope of this paper, but section four makes a start. A regression analysis of the DEU data indicates that previously identified factors, such as the location of a country’s preferences and the number of issues they care strongly about, help explain at least some of the results. They certainly don’t explain the relatively high salience-weighted losses of Germany, and especially France, but they might account for Italy’s poor showing. I also consider, and ultimately reject, the possibility that the EU works through a highly developed form of linkage, in which small Member States’ disproportionate bargaining success on daily legislation is compensation for the relative disadvantages they experience in other areas of EU activity such as budgetary transfers or Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Before concluding, I discuss the potential implications of differential national bargaining success for the legitimacy of the integration process.

National preferences and EU legislation: how the EU supposedly works
Would we expect the content of daily EU policy to be more congruent with, say, Germany’s preferences than Luxembourg’s, or closer to France’s ideal outcomes than Ireland’s? In my view, the two most plausible hypotheses about relative national bargaining success derive respectively from consociationalism and realism.  These theories offer fundamentally different pictures of what sort of organization the EU is and how it works: one where collective policies reflect the preferences of all Member States equally, the other where the preferences of some states count for more than others.
	Consociationalist theory posits that a disaffected sub-culture within a divided society can undermine regime legitimacy and have catastrophic effects on national political stability (Lijphart 1977). To avert this, these societies adopt formal and informal institutional arrangements that guarantee that no segment of the community consistently benefits more from government policies than any other. There are strong reasons to view the EU policy process in this light. 
The national administrations in the EU, who incorporate the views of national interest groups before coming to the EU bargaining table, are the functional equivalents of the ethnic, linguistic and religious political parties in the Dutch, Belgian and Swiss consociational systems…This facilitates the calculation of winners and losers of policy proposals along national rather than transnational/socio-economic lines (Hix 1999:202-3).

Of course any individual policy outcome will suit some states more than others – from the perspective of each state, you win some and you lose some. But the key point that many authors have emphasized is that, overall, when you aggregate the individual outcomes, it is essential that every state wins equally, since that confers a sense of legitimacy on the European integration process (Gabel 1998:471, Heritier 1999, Schneider, Steunenberg and Widgren 2006:314, Naurin and Wallace 2008:14). Notice that it is a matter of winning equally, not just whether the EU is pareto-efficient in that every state is made happier than the status quo. Writing specifically about Council legislation, Arregui and Thomson suggest that “the absence of clear winners and losers is essential to the legitimacy of the EU…outcomes are at least as close to any state’s position as to other states’ positions” (2009:671, emphasis added), just as Bailer’s study of EU legislation concluded that “overall, the relatively even distribution of negotiating success shows that the EU works quite effectively as a political system” (2004:113).
Those who construe equality of bargaining success across states as a normative imperative stress the operation of two particular mechanisms: diffuse reciprocity and a consensus norm. Diffuse reciprocity describes the situation whereby states make concessions on an issue they attach little salience to, on the understanding that they will be repaid in the future on an issue they care strongly about as other states return the favour. A consensus norm, in turn, enables any state that feels strongly enough to block an agreement, so that outcomes produce no disaffected minorities. These mechanisms reputedly ensure that when we tally up who achieves what across a large number of EU legislative outcomes, no state achieves significantly more of what it wants than any other (Heritier 1999, Elgstrom and Smith 2000, Mattila and Lane 2001, Heisenberg 2005, Lewis 2005, Arregui, Stokman and Thomson 2006:131, Thomson 2011).
Sometimes the “every state wins equally” view is stated explicitly, for instance in Heritier’s claim that diffuse reciprocity produces a “balanced profit sheet” for each state (1999:275). But more often the assumption is implicit, so deeply held that it need not be articulated. Combing through the studies listed above as well as the leading textbooks on EU integration one finds frequent references to mutual backscratching and consensus in Council legislative decisionmaking, and not once is it ever suggested that outcomes consistently reflect the preferences of some states more than others. This leads to the following, and in my view almost universally held, hypothesis:

H1: Within EU legislative decisionmaking, no Member State consistently achieves more or less of what it really wants than any other.
 
In sharp contrast, a realist perspective would predict that large Member States – especially Germany, France and the UK -- would dominate the decisionmaking process. Not only do large states wield more formal voting power than small states under QMV, they also command substantial economic and administrative advantages regardless of the voting rules (Hix and Hoyland 2011:16, Thomson 2011:188). Initially labelled “intergovernmental institutionalism”, and built on realist foundations (Moravcsik 1991:27), the notion that the large Member States make the rules and get what they prefer, and the small basically take what they can get, is most often associated with the work of Andrew Moravcsik and his liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) theory (1991,1993,1998).
Although Moracvsik’s views are often invoked when people emphasise the dominant role of large Member States in the EU legislative process, what he predicts about winners and losers remains frustratingly obscure. Despite his earlier suggestion that ‘properly specified [LI] will be helpful in explaining many everyday decisions’ (1995:613), Moravcsik later insisted that LI applies exclusively to ‘history making bargains’ and doesn’t extend to ‘the everyday legislative process’ (1998:8). To my knowledge he has never offered any specific predictions about whether EU legislation is generally more congruent with the interests of some Member States than others. If pressed on who has the most bargaining success on everyday outcomes, France or Luxembourg, Germany or Ireland, Moravcsik would presumably privilege the large states, since the alternative would concede the possibility that LI is largely irrelevant. After all, the reason that actors have diverging preferences over treaty reform, as in any institutional design, is that they have diverging preferences over future outcomes (Tsebelis 1990, Krehbiel 1991, Jupille 2004). Member states fight over ‘high politics’ issues such as new voting rules, new institutions, and new areas of EU competence precisely because they are concerned about the impact of such treaty reform on day-to-day policy-making, the point at which payoffs for each state actually materialise. It would be paradoxical if treaties reflected primarily the preferences of the large Member States rather than the small, but the subsequent stream of policies they produced did not. This leads me to the following realist, and arguably Moravcsikian hypothesis:

H2: Within EU legislative decisionmaking, large Member States consistently achieve more of what they really want than small ones.

How to identify relative winners and losers
I utilise the most comprehensive available dataset that contains the ingredients necessary to compare national bargaining success over a large number of cases. In their acclaimed book, The European Union Decides (EUD), a team of researchers gathered data throughout the period 1999-2001 on 162 policy issues contained in 66 legislative proposals from the Commission (Thomson et al. 2006). An important feature of the case selection process was that all of the issues were deemed by experts to be significant and controversial across the Member States. For each issue, they were able to identify and scale the policy alternative most preferred by each Member State, the salience each state attached to the issue, and the position of the eventual legislative outcome. The EUD data has been discussed and used in many publications, and is now possibly as familiar to researchers of European integration as the POLITY dataset is to comparativists.
Previous studies of bargaining success have also used the EUD dataset, but their analyses suffer from some important conceptual and methodological limitations. Below, I suggest improvements along both dimensions and highlight the advantages my approach offers. Before turning to these, three potential concerns about the data deserve special attention. First, what do the national policy positions recounted by experts to the EUD interviewers actually represent? Are they each state’s true preferences on a policy issue or merely strategic misrepresentations, perhaps deliberately exaggerated starting positions in anticipation of ‘giving in’ later? Second, while it is obvious that each state cares about some policy issues much more than others, do the salience scores reflect this adequately? Third, how should we handle the small number of cases where a state did not express any position on an issue? Should we drop these observations or try to impute the missing values?
There are probably no definite answers to these concerns, and to some degree the possibility that data limitations such as noise and measurement error confound the validity of any results is an unavoidable problem. But there are good reasons to believe that, in terms of national positions, the EUD data may not be not perfect but are at least fit for purpose. The EUD research design used answers from multiple interview partners to triangulate national scores, which greatly reduces the scope for exaggeration or outright deception. Quantitative analysis by Thomson (2011:ch6) found that states’ initial scores accurately reflect national preferences and that hidden positions were not a fundamental feature of the data. Moreover, the policy positions and outcomes have also been validated against external sources (Konig, Lindberg, Lechner and Pohlmeier 2007). In light of this, I follow standard practice and refer to each state’s national policy scores interchangeably as their “ideal positions” or “preferred positions” (Bailer 2004:109, Selck and Kaeding 2004:86, Selck and Kuipers 2005:162, Aksoy 2010:524).
 As with the national position scores, measures of salience are subject to some limitations but still highly informative. Experts were asked to rate how important each issue was to each Member State, on a scale from 0-100. The validity of this ranking is a crucial assumption that underpins the many studies that have used the EUD data to test various legislative bargaining models. Once again, triangulation from multiple interview partners helps reduce measurement error. It is also reassuring that the recorded salience scores do appear to matter as expected -- models that utilise them outperform ones that don’t (Thomson, Stokman, Achen and Konig 2006, Schneider at el 2010). Still, it is unfortunate that the experts were not also asked to assess the relative salience of each issue against the others to produce a global ranking from 1 to 162 for each state. Perhaps such an exercise was never even feasible given the longitudinal nature of the project and the sectoral division of labour in Council, as it would require each expert to possess detailed recollection of negotiations on an enormous number of varied policies spread over several years.
On the question of whether or not to employ imputation of missing values in the EUD dataset, experienced researchers have adopted very different approaches. There are demanding assumptions the data must satisfy before imputation is appropriate, and a variety of technical solutions that yield quite different results (King et al 2001, Konig et al 2005). Robert Thomson argues against using imputation (2011:ch3) and his studies of bargaining success therefore exclude observations where national policy positions are missing (Arregui and Thomson 2009, Thomson 2011). By contrast, Stefanie Bailer, also a member of the original DEU team, employs imputation in her study of bargaining success (Bailer 2004), as do Torsten Selck and his co-authors in theirs (Selck and Kaeding 2004, Selck and Kuipers 2005). To avoid getting mired in the ongoing debate over the merits or pitfalls of imputation, throughout the remainder of this paper I report results both with imputation (Bailer’s data) and without (Thomson’s data) and identify any significant differences that arise.

Conceptual improvements




The eventual outcome was in fact 80, which required a country of origin label for non-EU countries, made special provisions for the labelling of blended honeys, and allowed mention of the region under certain conditions.
The example holds important implications for how we should operationalise relative national bargaining success on daily EU policymaking. If states cared equally about all issues, then to identify each one’s gain for a given policy we would simply calculate the distance between their ideal and the outcome, and declare the state with the smallest distance to be the biggest winner. This is what previous studies have done. But states don’t care equally about every issue – Germany, for instance, viewed honey labelling as fairly trivial whereas Portugal saw it as highly salient.  Whether some states lost badly or won more often than others on issues they deemed largely irrelevant is not especially interesting or theoretically informative. To get a proper sense of winners and losers in our example we therefore need to discount the 60 point gap for Germany and appreciate the 20 point gap for Portugal.
The most straightforward way to do this is to multiply each state’s “simple” loss by the salience it attached to the issue. I define each actor’s salience-weighted loss on each issue as follows:

Salience weight lossia = |xia-outcome|*sia	(2)

where i indicates the issue, a indicates the actor, and s indicates the level of salience.  
[TABLE 1]
Using the honey labelling example, Table 2 contrasts the naïve simple loss with the more appropriate salience weighted loss for each state. On both scales Austria and Belgium were the biggest winners. But adjusting for salience reveals that Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden actually achieved more, not less, of what they really wanted than did France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
An alternative way to measure success would be to compare each state’s satisfaction with the outcome to their satisfaction with the status quo reference point (Aksoy 2010). I follow all other previous studies of EU legislative bargaining success in rejecting this approach (Bailer 2004, Selck and Kaeding 2004, Selck and Kuipers 2005, Arregui and Thomson 2009, Thomson 2011) on the grounds that there is strong evidence that Member States judge the merits of potential outcomes against their ideal positions, not against the reference point. Models of EU decisionmaking that treat the status quo as an important consideration have been shown to make significantly less accurate predictions (Thomson et al 2006, Thomson 2011:ch7).
The key question is what happens when we aggregate the honey example with dozens of other daily policies? When we sum up the respective payoffs across all these individual issues, do the salience-weighted losses even out as H1 predicts? Or do large Member States beat small ones as H2 predicts? Using the EUD data, Bailer (2004:112-113), Arregui and Thomson (2009), and Thomson (2011:ch10) all found support for H1. By contrast, Selck and Kaeding (2004) found that the UK and Germany did better than France or Italy and that the performance of the latter two were statistically indistinguishable. Selck and Kuipers (2005) found that both Sweden and Finland did better than Denmark.
As mentioned above, the main conceptual problem with previous studies is that, with the exception of Aksoy (2010), they all wrongly used a simple, unweighted loss function rather than examining salience weighted losses.2 Moreover, none of these studies explicitly investigated H2 -- whether or not outcomes are more congruent with the ideal points of large Member States than small states.3 To be clear, I am certainly not suggesting that previous studies have simply ignored the issue of salience, just that they have mishandled it. Several have pointed out that salience matters as a determinant of bargaining success (Bailer 2004, Arregui and Thomson 2009, Thomson 2011), but this is not the same thing as building salience directly into the dependent variable and directly comparing the bargaining success of particular states.

Methodological improvements
The methodological problem with previous studies is that none conducted the appropriate statistical tests to discover whether national bargaining success rates differ. Bailer (2004) calculates means and standard deviations for the success rate of each Member State, Arregui and Thomson (2009) and Thomson (2011) calculate means and confidence intervals. Then, finding that the means with their standard deviations are very similar, and that almost none of these confidence intervals overlap,4 all these authors conclude that the national means are indistinguishable. But sample means can differ significantly even if the confidence intervals overlap heavily, which is why it is essential to employ a technique such as t-tests that compares national means and variances directly. Moreover, to discern whether one state does consistently better than another we need to compare them issue-by-issue using a paired t-test, in the same manner that one compares the performance of one decisionmaking model versus another (Thomson et al 2006, Thomson 2011). 
[FIGURE 2]

Figure 2 illustrates both these points. Judging from the overlapping confidence intervals we would mistakenly conclude that policy outcomes were just as congruent with the preferences of the two states, when in fact the t-tests reveal that the means differ significantly. Moreover, discarding information about how the data are paired greatly reduces the power of the test. In this hypothetical example, as shown in the right panel, each of the policy outcomes is consistently closer to the ideal points of the big state. Exploiting this information yields a much lower p-value. Of course the distances might have been paired differently – 20 with 100, 25 with 95, 40 with 90 etc. If so, the unpaired t-test would produce the same result, now erroneous, whereas the paired t-test would reveal the correct conclusion that the means were actually indistinguishable (p=.16). 

Testing the hypotheses
To test the two hypotheses I start by calculating the salience-weighted loss for each Member State for the 162 controversial issues contained in the EUD dataset. For each issue there is one observation for each Member State that took a position. Following Arregui and Thomson (2009) and Thomson (2011), I exclude missing observations where a Member State took no position, but as mentioned above I will also report the main results using the imputed values in Stefanie Bailer’s data.
As a formal test of whether every state wins equally, I fit a linear regression with country dummies and checked whether all the coefficients were indistinguishable from zero. They were not, which suggests that in daily EU legislative decisionmaking, if a consensus norm exists at all, it does not prevent some states from consistently achieving significantly more of what they really want than others (model F<.001). Using imputed values for missing national positions yielded an even stronger rejection of the null hypothesis (all regression results are available from the author).
[TABLE 2]
Having established that there are differences between national means and rejected H1, we turn to H2, that large states beat small states. Table 2 presents pairwise comparisons between large and small state average salience-weighted losses. The results provide absolutely no support for H2. Remarkably, in none of the 44 comparisons does any large state achieve significantly more than any small state. If anything, legislative outcomes tend to be more congruent with the preferences of small states than large ones. Taking p<.1 as the criterion for significance -- as previous studies have done (Bailer 2004, Selck and Kuipers 2005, Arregui and Thomson 2009, Thomson 2011) -- France does significantly worse than Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland, and both Finland and Sweden achieve statistically more than Italy. Since Bonferonni adjustments are overly conservative (Perneger 1998), I also employed the more powerful Holm-Bonferonni method (Holm 1979). Doing so provides the further finding that Finland beats Germany as well. H2 fares even worse if we use imputed values. As shown in the right panel of Table 2, not only do all the pairwise differences in the left panel remain significant, but now France loses to two more small states (Austria and Luxembourg), as does Italy (Ireland and Luxembourg), and Germany loses to three more (Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden). In purely dyadic terms, the results in Table 2 illustrate a sevenfold increase in the extent of unequal outcomes compared to what previous studies have claimed. Without imputed values, Robert Thomson found one unequal dyad (Sweden beat France) whereas I identify seven; with imputed values Stefanie Bailer found two unequal dyads (Sweden and Finland beat France) whereas I identify fourteen. 
A substantial caveat is in order here. What this analysis cant reveal is whether the disparities in national bargaining success that I’ve identified are consistent over time. After all, the 162 issues from the EUD dataset provide a wide-angle snapshot of EU daily politics, but a snapshot nevertheless. With a longer timeframe we might be able to salvage one of the hypotheses. It would be misleading to view the bargaining successes of small states during 1999-2001 as relatively impressive if they are payback for France, Germany and Italy having been big winners in previous years, just as they would look different if set against a pattern of post-2001 legislative outcomes that tended to coincide with the ideal points of large states.
But based on the current data, all EU states do not win equally, nor do large states tend to get more of what they want than small states. In other words, we now know more about how Europe does not work. This might sound deflating at first, but it is in fact hugely significant, for it is only when we discard mistaken assumptions about how society works that we become receptive to new and better explanations. Or, to say it with King, Keohane and Verba, “a negative result is as useful as a positive one; both can provide just as much information about the world” (1996:105). Moreover, it will hopefully incentivise researchers to develop new positive theories that can both explain these surprising empirical results and reliably predict future bargaining outcomes. While admittedly very preliminary, the remaining sections of this paper take a first few steps towards formulating an explanation of how the EU does, really, work, and also addressing a normative question raised by my findings: whether disparate national bargaining success – whatever its causes – undermines EU legitimacy.

Why do some states win more than others, and does it matter?
We might consider several explanations for why some of the smaller states tend to significantly outperform some of the large ones in terms of legislative bargaining success. One possibility is to focus on the factors other studies have identified as determinants of unweighted bargaining success. These might account for the pairwise results in Table 2. A second explanation is that a state’s relative bargaining success in the legislative arena is compensation for its relative losses in other fields of EU activity, such as the budget or economic and monetary union (EMU).  I consider each of these in turn.
Five of the variables included in previous studies of bargaining success deserve particular consideration: the relative location of a country’s preferences; the depth of diplomatic network relations they share with other states; whether the country holds the Presidency of the Council of Ministers; the negotiating skill of the country’s Council representatives; and the number of issues the country cares strongly about. These variables are described in great detail elsewhere, so a quick summary suffices (Bailer 2004, Arregui and Thomson 2009, Thomson 2011). If a state holds an extreme position it might end up isolated, less able to build a winning coalition, and thus experience greater losses. A state whose ideal position is fortunately in close proximity to the preference of the Commission or European Parliament might endure smaller losses since these supranational actors wield agenda-setting and veto power. We would expect legislative outcomes to be closer to the ideal points of Member States who are particularly active coalition-builders, as measured by their stock of network capital (which for the EU15 states ranges from 0.54 to 3.72), or who happen to hold the rotating Council presidency when an agreement is reached and are thus able to control the agenda, or who experts believe possess great skill at negotiation. Finally, if a country just doesn’t feel very strongly on many issues, perhaps because it has a narrow range of interests on which it concentrates attention, this will naturally reduce its aggregate salience-weighted losses. Larger states take a position on a higher proportion of issues than do small states (Arregui and Thomson 2009:670), and not taking a position seems to indicate that a state simply doesn’t care about it – the average salience score drops from 58 to 11. I therefore control for the proportion of cases in which a state takes a position.
Ideally, we would also include a dummy variable for each Member State in the regression analysis of salience weighted loss, but unfortunately this is not viable; several get excluded due to multi-collinearity with the other explanatory variables. So to get additional insight into the comparisons reported in Table 2, I treat the eleven smaller states as the reference category and include four dummies for the largest states.
[TABLE 3]
Table 3 presents the regression results for all the issues pooled together, as well as separately for issues subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) and unanimity. The results are highly consistent whether we use data with or without imputed values for missing ideal positions.
Several findings stand out. First, existing theories explain some of the inequalities presented in Table 2. The statistically insignificant dummy for Italy suggests that Italy’s preference extremity, network capital and the proportion of positions it took might account for why it lost to several small states. But these factors don’t account for France and Germany’s extremely poor showing against smaller states. Even after controlling for the other variables in the model, the dummies for France and Germany are large, negative, and statistically significant. This also shows that the ability of small states to shape legislative outcomes does not hinge, as some have suggested, on their “having the Commission as a key partner” or having “used the Presidency to increase their influence” (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006:660,662). Second, the magnitude of the negative (or positive) effects associated with particular states is large enough that they can swamp other variables. In the aggregated cases, and under QMV, the bargaining handicap France experiences from being France is equivalent to losing two and a half points (a huge drop, over two standard deviations) on the network capital scale, and more than negates the gain in bargaining success associated with holding the Presidency or the benefits of taking a position on only a narrow range of issues. Third, neither negotiating skill nor proximity to the preferences of supranational actors have any significant effect on salience-weighted national bargaining success. Fourth, formal rules matter, in that the decisionmaking process under QMV differs markedly from that under unanimity. When the treaty stipulates that unanimous voting applies, unlike under QMV, who a state knows (network capital) and whether it chooses to focus on a subset of issues (positions taken) are irrelevant to that state’s bargaining success. That small states beat large ones under QMV but not unanimity illustrates that Council negotiations take place in the shadow of the vote and reaffirms the doubts I expressed earlier about the consensus norm. It also seems to suggest that all states, regardless of their size, can effectively exercise their formal veto.
A second explanation for my findings would be that the EU works through a highly developed form of linkage or diffuse reciprocity, in which a Member State’s losses on daily legislation are compensated by disproportionate gains elsewhere. Two obvious candidates for this type of linkage are EMU and financial transfers. In the big picture, things might even out as H1 predicts, or even tilt towards the large states as H2 predicts if large states tended to lose on daily legislation but were the big relative winners on EMU. The same would be true if small states tended to win on daily legislation but contributed much more than their fair share to the EU budget.
Although theoretically possible and worth investigating, I don’t find such linkage very plausible. None of the existing work, either quantitative or case-study based, suggests that this sort of complex trade-off occurs, and one would be hard pressed to argue that Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Ireland and Austria did so well on daily EU legislation because large states were compensating them for having suffered badly from the effects of EMU. If anything, linkage with EMU makes the findings about legislation even more surprising, since when EMU was launched “on the basis of simple economic cost-benefit calculations, the smaller states were more likely to benefit than the larger states” (Hix 1999:291). At present it seems likely that in an attempt to save EMU, the EU will morph into a transfer union, funded primarily by Germany and to a lesser extent France. If this trend continues, large states might soon come to view EMU not as a source of compensation for their lack of legislative bargaining success, but rather an onerous burden that merely exacerbates overall levels of national inequality and further erodes EU legitimacy.
Nor can my findings readily be explained as a product of linkage to the EU budget. Most of the small states, and not just the poor ones, are big financial winners (Carrubba 1997, Rodden 2002, Mattila 2006). Again this makes the findings even more surprising. Small states have their cake and eat it too -- they do especially well at enshrining their preferences in EU legislation, while also receiving a disproportionate share of EU financial transfers (Golub 2011). So even if we broaden our scope, casting the net of national equality wider than just legislative outcomes, it appears that not all states win equally, and that EU policies are particularly congruent with the interests of some of the smaller states.
Apart from the challenge this paper poses to develop better positive theories of EU decisionmaking, it holds important normative implications. For if we retain belief in consociationalism’s normative tenet, namely that an equal distribution of national wins and losses fosters legitimacy, then uncovering actual inequality between Member States’ bargaining success could seriously jeopardise the already fraught nature of the EU. Of course legitimacy also depends on many other factors, such as checks and balances, transparency, a common identity (demos), contestation for leadership, and whether integration ignites a regulatory race-to-the-bottom (Moravcsik 2006, Hix 2011). But Arregui and Thomson, speaking specifically about legislative outcomes, state a common and deeply held belief when they remind us that “the absence of clear winners and losers is essential to the legitimacy of the EU” (2009:671). As a matter of output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999), we would expect significant differences in relative national bargaining success to erode the value of the EU in the eyes of its members, and therefore undermine the durability of the integration project. This is especially true if, as suggested above, national inequalities in legislative outcomes exacerbate, rather than compensate for, national inequalities in other areas such as the budget and EMU.
Alternatively, the dominant normative view might be wrong, in that disparate national bargaining success will have no negative consequences for EU legitimacy. For example, French and German governments as well as their respective interest groups might find the very idea of a united Europe attractive enough that consistently losing out to smaller states hardly matters. A more worrying variant of this possibility is that EU legitimacy rests on blissful ignorance. Tsoukalis is probably correct that “a relatively equitable distribution of the gains and losses, or at least the perception of such an equitable distribution, can be a determining factor for the continuation of the integration process” (1993:228, emphasis added). A fundamental disconnect between what happens in Brussels and how it is perceived at home would sustain the illusion. Domestic groups and national governments might continue to buy into the prevailing view that all members of the EU club win equally, but a misperception of equality hardly provides a solid foundation on which to construct an ever closer Union.

CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this study was to advance our understanding of relative national bargaining success over EU legislation. The handful of previous analyses that considered this question suffer from conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To help correct these, I presented a salience-weighted measure of national bargaining success and used it, along with the best available dataset we have -- the 162 issues from the European Union Decides project -- to test two hypotheses. Hypothesis one, the almost universally held view of the EU, predicted that the operation of a consensus norm and diffuse reciprocity in the Council of Ministers would guarantee that, when aggregated across many different decisions, policy outcomes were just as congruent with the ideal preferences of one Member State as with any other. In other words, all states win equally. Hypothesis two, based on a realist, and arguably Moravcsikian view of the EU, predicted that large states would beat small ones.
The absence of empirical support for either hypothesis compels us to face up to the untenability of our prevailing assumptions about what sort of organisation the EU is and how its decisionmaking process works. National differences in legislative bargaining success are much more pronounced than previously recognised – seven times greater on a dyadic measure, and large enough so that the benefit or handicap associated with a particular state can swamp the effects of other variables such as holding the Presidency or having a large stock of network capital -- and the relative winners tend to be the small states rather than the large ones. Of the forty-four pairwise comparisons of average salience-weighted bargaining losses, small states beat large ones anywhere from seven to fourteen times (depending on whether we use imputed values for missing data), and not once did any large state beat any small state. France, Italy and Germany did especially poorly, whereas Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and the Nordic states did particularly well. The consensus norm and diffuse reciprocity, so often touted as distinguishing features of national interaction within the Council of Ministers, apparently operate far less frequently and with much less of an equalising effect than many believe. They certainly do not prevent some states from consistently winning significantly more than others. 
From a broader theoretical perspective, such disparate empirical national success presents a surprising picture of how the EU works that currently has no clear explanation. It is certainly hard to square with a consociationalist interpretation of the EU. A realist interpretation fares even worse, since legislative outcomes tend to align more with the preferences of small Member States than large ones. This pattern also contradicts key aspects of Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory, unless one stretches LI beyond all recognition so as to accommodate a situation where treaty bargains reflect primarily the preferences of the large Member States rather than the small, but the subsequent stream of policies treaties produce do not.
Demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does represents a significant negative finding, one that sets the stage for new research in both positive and normative theory. We need to identify the factors that explain the surprising empirical results, but we also need to consider the effects that disparate national bargaining success might have on EU legitimacy. As a tentative start, I’ve suggested that familiar factors such as network capital, the relative position of national preferences, and the frequency with which states take positions might help explain Italy’s poor showing, but they dont account for why some small states beat France and Germany. I’ve also posited that the EU might work through complex linkage between daily legislative outcomes and its other “big ticket” items, with small states achieving disproportionate success in the former as compensation for relative disadvantages they experience in the latter. Although worth exploring, such linkage seems unlikely to me, since budget transfers and the operation of EMU only reinforce the overall tilt of the EU towards the preferences of the small states. From a normative perspective, EU legitimacy is in trouble if it depends on aggregate national equality across legislative outcomes to the extent that many have suggested, or if it depends on large states receiving disproportionate compensation outside of the legislative arena. That EU legitimacy within the large Member States is sustained partly by blissful ignorance or misperception of actual inequalities is a troubling possibility. 
It is important to reiterate that my conclusions are only as good as the data, and therefore must be treated as a cautious first step towards a better understanding of how the EU does or does not work. More satisfactory answers to questions about national bargaining success, the EU’s decisionmaking procedures and the legitimacy of the integration process require reliable data for several different time periods. Fortunately, thanks to continuing work by members of the DEU team it should be possible to extend the timeframe forward. My suggested approach of using a salience-weighted loss function, paired t-tests and country dummies will help researchers get the most from these data.

NOTES
1 Throughout, when discussing the relative ability of Member States to upload their preferences into EU legislation my terminology follows that of previous studies in that I interchangeably use the terms “national bargaining success,” national “winners and losers”, and “congruence” between national interests and outcomes.
2 The only exception is Aksoy (2010), who employs a salience-weighted loss function. However, her measure differs significantly from mine in that it compares each state’s preferred position to the status quo.  
3 In multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) plots of the EUD data, legislative outcomes appear closer to the preferred points of some of the larger states than some of the smaller ones (Thomson, Boerefijn, Stokman 2004:250, Thomson 2011: figure 3.2), but this is not especially informative since these plots entirely ignore the issue of salience. Moreover, what really matters is whether any of the differences in distance are statistically significant and MDS plots do not provide this information. This explains why Thomson and his co-authors use the plots to establish the dimensionality of the issue space but do not try to infer anything from them about relative winners and losers. Others have also noted the inadequacy of using such plots for evaluating national bargaining success (Selck and Kaeding 2004:91 and Selck and Kuisters 2005:165). 
4 Apart from two instances in Bailer (2004) that she does not explicitly report, and one instance in Thomson (2011).
Biographical note: Jonathan Golub is Reader in Political Science, University of Reading, UK

Address for correspondence: Jonathan Golub, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, Reading RG6 6AA, UK. Email: j.s.golub@rdg.ac.uk

REFERENCES
Arregui, J., Stokman, F. and Thomson, R. (2004) ‘Bargaining in the European Union and Shifts in Actors’ Policy Positions’, European Union Politics 5(1):47-72. 

Arregui, J., Stokman, F. and Thomson, R. (2006) ‘Compromise, exchange and challenge in the European Union’, in R. Thomson, F. Stokman, C. Achen and T. Konig (eds), The European Union Decides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Arregui, J. and Thomson, R. (2009) ‘States’ bargaining success in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy 16(5):655-676.

Bailer, S. (2004) ‘Bargaining success in the European Union: the impact of exogenous and endogenous power resources’, European Union Politics  5:99-124. 

Borzel, T. (2002) ‘Member state responses to europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40:193-214.

Caporaso, J., Cowles. M. and Risse, T. (eds.) (2000) Transforming Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Carrubba, C. (1997) ‘Net financial transfers in the European Union: who gets what and why?’, Journal of Politics 59(2):469-96.

Elgstrom, O. and Smith, M. (2000) ‘Introduction: negotiation and policy-making in the European Union – processes, system and order’, Journal of European Public Policy 7(5):673-683.

Gabel, M. (1998) ‘The endurance of supranational governance: a consociational interpretation of the European Union’, Comparative Politics 30(4):463-475.

Golub, J. (2011) ‘Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?’ Journal of European Public Policy

Heisenberg, D. (2005) ‘The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union: formal versus informal decisionmaking in the Council’, European Journal of Political Research 44:65-90.

Heritier, A. (1999) ‘Elements of democratic legitimation in Europe: an alternative perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy 6(2):269-282.

Hix, S. (1999) The Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke:Macmillan).

Hix, S. and Hoyland, B. (2011) The Political System of the European Union (3rd ed.) (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

Holm, S. (1979) ‘A simple sequential rejective multiple test procedure’, Scandinavian Journal of Statistics 6:65-70.

Jupille, J. (2004) Procedural Politics: Issues, Interests and Institutional Choice in the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

King, G., R. Keohane and S. Verba (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Knill, C. (1998) ‘European policies: the impact of national administrative traditions’, Journal of Public Policy 18:1-28.

Konig, T., D. Finke and S. Daimer (2005) ‘Ignoring the non-ignorables: missingness and missing positions,’ European Union Politics 6(3):269-290.

Konig, T. and Proksch, S. (2006) ‘A procedural exchange model of EU legislative politics’, in R. Thomson, F. Stokman, C. Achen and T. Konig (eds) The European Union Decides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Konig, T., Lindberg, B., Lechner, S. and Pohlmeier, W. (2007) Bicameral conflict resolution in the European Union: an empirical analysis of conciliation committee bargains’, British Journal of Political Science 37(2):281-312.

Krehbiel, K. (1991) Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press).

Lewis, J. (2005) ‘The Janus face of Brussels: socialization and everyday decisionmaking in the European Union’, International Organization 59(4):937-71.

Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Mattila, M. and Lane, J. (2001) ‘Why unanimity in the Council? A roll call analysis of Council voting’, European Union Politics 2(1):31-52.

Mattila, M. (2006) ‘Fiscal transfers and redistribution in the European Union: do smaller members states get more than their share?’, Journal of European Public Policy 13(1):34-51.

Moravcsik, A. (1991) ‘Negotiating the single act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community’, International Organization 45(1):19-56.

Moravcsik, A. (1995) ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism and integration: a rejoinder’, Journal of Common market Studies 33(4):611-628.

Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

Moravcsik, A. (2003) ‘Liberal international relations theory: a scientific assessment,” in Elman and Elman (eds.) Progress in International Relations Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press).
 
Naurin, D. and Wallace, H. (2008) ‘Introduction: from rags to riches’, in Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Basingstoke:Palgrave).

Perneger, T. (1998) ‘What’s wrong with Bonferroni adjustments’, British Medical Journal 316:1236-1238.

Rodden, J. (2002) ‘Strength in numbers? Representation and redistribution in the European Union’, European Union Politics 3(2):151-75.

Schneider, G., Steunenberg, B. and Widgren, M. (2006) ‘Evidence with insight: what models contribute to EU research,” in R. Thomson, F. Stokman, C. Achen and T. Konig (eds). The European Union Decides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
 
Selck, T. and Keading, M. (2004) ‘Diverging interests and different success rates: France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in EU legislative negotiations’, French Politics 2:81-95.

Selck, T. and Kuipers, S. (2005) ‘Shared hesitance, joint success: Denmark, Finland and Sweden in the European Union policy process’, Journal of European Public Policy 12(1):157-76.

Thomson, R. (2011) Resolving Controversy in the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Thomson, R., Stokman, F., Achen, C. and T. Konig (eds) (2006) The European Union Decides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Thorhallsson, B. and A. Wivel (2006) ‘Small states in the European Union: what do we know and what would we like to know?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4):651-668.





FIGURE 1	The ‘place of origin’ labelling issue in the honey directive. Each Member State is located at what it considers to be the ideal outcome, with salience scores in parentheses. AUS = Austria, BEL = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, GER = Germany, GRE = Greece, IRE = Ireland, ITY = Italy, LUX = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, POR = Portugal, SP = Spain, SWE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom

















TABLE 1	National bargaining success on the ‘place of origin’ labelling issue in the honey directive. A low loss ranking (15 lowest, 1 highest) indicates greater relative bargaining success.

 


















TABLE 2	Pairwise comparisons of average national salience-weighted losses (1999-2001). Paired t-tests with
unadjusted p-values in parentheses. Cell values are the average for the row (small) state minus the average for the
column (large) state. Negative numbers thus signify comparisons where a small state beats a large state.
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TABLE 3 Factors affecting bargaining success. Dependent variable is the salience-weighted distance between states’ ideal positions and legislative outcomes. Standard errors in parentheses, robust standard errors clustered at the level of issues within the dataset. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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